Authoritarian rule is the ruling of one party over a state and its people with little or no constitutional responsibility to the population (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006). Although many authoritarian systems have been overturned in the recent Arab Springs, it is interesting to note their ability to survive for as long as they did, and to observe those that continue to exist. For the large part, it would appear that the persistence of authoritarian rule is the product of five key factors: weak civil society; a centralised economy; geographical location; poverty and cultural or religious underpinnings (Bellin, 2004).
I aim to examine the definition and conception of authoritarian states, and look at each factor that contributes to the longevity of authoritarian rule. Vietnam will be used as an example of an authoritarian state throughout.
How authoritarian rule is defined and what it entails
The definition of what exactly constitutes an authoritarian system is contentious but Hadenius and Teorell have identified three categories of authoritarian systems; monarchies, militant systems and electoral systems (2006). These three are not mutually exclusive, and they all have the following core characteristic; there is a single governing body that rules over the population with little accountability and no responsibility to the public.
There are three defining features that can be observed in most authoritarian systems. These are concerned with a lack of public involvement in politics, the control of public freedoms like that of speech or assembly, and the tendency to use Communism or Socialism as a basis for authoritarian rule (Geddes, 2005). The public plays little role in electing leaders or lobbying for policies, leaving politicians in power much room for the development of policies that they can impose on the population at will. Authoritarian systems, by nature, are built around the restriction of individual freedoms, like the freedom of speech or assembly, as these personal liberties can pose great threat to the autocrats in power. Many regimes appear to use Communism or Socialism as an ideological basis to their restrictions, justifying that limiting individual freedoms will produce greater social equality.
Authoritarian rule is not to be confused with that of totalitarian rule. Totalitarianism is a subcategory of authoritarian rule, and it is a system that aims to control and transform the total fabric of a country according to an ideological goal. These ambitions mean that leaders often resort to violence and stringent policies in order to repress and overcome obstacles (Oneil, 2007). The only contemporary example of a totalitarian state is North Korea, but in the past Stalin’s era, Nazi Germany and China during the Cultural Revolution have all been classified as totalitarian.
The conception of authoritarian regimes
To fully understand how authoritarian regimes are able to persist it is important to consider how they first came about. Levitsky and Way outline two, broad possibilities; an inherent, ruling class that is not willing to relinquish their dominion or the election of a militant leader, both of these categories have to make use of authoritarian practices to maintain their power (2002). In the case of the ruling elite (often a royal family) their power will have likely have been inherited over centuries and when faced with contemporary ideas of freedom and “rule of the people”, there was a need to restrict freedoms and impose controls so as to not jeopardise their control. Alternatively, an autocratic leader may have been elected into power. These elections were commonly rigged and fraudulent, but once the leader was installed to office their oppressive, authoritarian policies were instated to ensure unchallenged rule (Levitsky & Way, 2002). The latter example was very common in the 1960s when African countries first gained independence.
How authoritarian regimes are sustained
There are various arguments surrounding the survival of authoritarian regimes, particularly in light of the recent displays of civil protest and unrest. Hadenius and Teorell theorise on the possibility that electoral systems within an authoritarian regime are directly responsible for the longevity of the system; stating that the one-party systems with leader elections last longer (2006). This paper will, however, focus on the broader arguments provided by Bellin using the sub-categories she outlined, as well as additional information sourced from other academics (2004). Vietnam, which is currently classified as an authoritarian state, will be used as an example to show how each category can be applied to an existing authoritarian regime.
Weak civil society
Given South Africa’s history and the role civic organisations (like the Black Sash) played in the struggle against apartheid, it is not difficult to understand the importance of civil society when securing a democracy. This being said, it is also not hard to understand that states that are ruled by autocrats tend to have fewer civic organisations, and those that do exist are weak and ineffective (Bellin, 2004). This means that labour unions are unable to facilitate effective collective bargaining as the threat of civil unrest, if conditions are not met, is low; rendering them near-useless. Oxhorn described in detail the importance of civil society in the democratisation process, he based his discussions on Chile, but his theories of civic unity and influence could be applied to many authoritarian regimes (1995).
In Vietnam, the government has suppressed (through a spate of harsh convictions) many activists and independent bloggers who have written about the Vietnamese government and its questionable policies and election process (Thayer, 2009). This is a gross restriction on civil liberty, and clear proof as to how limiting civil protest can limit a societies’ ability to fight oppression.
A centralised economy
The idea of a centralised economy aiding the prevalence of authoritarian regimes is consistent with previously mentioned notions of Communism or Socialism being used as a basis for autocratic rule. In authoritarian states, the economy is controlled by the government and the public sector accounts for the majority of employment and income. Having a strong public sector economy makes it difficult for private sector firms to challenge state power through financial sanctions or lobbying (Bellin, 2004). This ultimately means that a centralised economy, and strong public sector involvement allows authoritarian regimes to endure.
Although the Vietnamese economy has opened up in recent years, it is still largely centralised with almost all private businesses being classified as either “small” or “medium” enterprises (Duk, 2013). The lack of big, powerful businesses makes it clear that the private sector contribution to the economy is not enough to challenge government monopolies.
Poverty
Being in situations of dire poverty mean that democracy and political reform are not a priority of the citizens of authoritarian states, as pointed out by Bellin (2004). This poverty often translates into very low literacy rates, making education poor and largely inaccessible. There is a lessened the chance of an uprising in the light of other, seemingly more important, issues like that of education. While it is not likely that leaders in power promote poor education, it is possible that they have reason to be frightened by a better educated population, particularly if that education is to be westernised.
While Vietnam has high literacy rates, the state remains poverty-stricken, with a GDP per capita of only $3500 (CIA World Fact Book, 2012). Agriculture remains the largest sector in the economy; a sign that the country is still in its “developing” stage, and unlikely to prioritise political reform.
Geographic location
The demonstration effect describes how neighbouring countries are able to transform into democracies when they can see it happening in other states that boarder them. This means that an authoritarian regime has a higher chance of survival if neighbouring countries are authoritarian too, and few countries who do not share a boundary with a democratic country are able to successfully transform into one. This is because, on a civil level, witnessing freedom (not just reading about it, or hearing about it) is an excellent incentive to want to create it. If citizens of one country see neighbouring countries enjoying freedoms that they cannot, they will be motivated to lobby for it.
Vietnam shares a boundary with three countries; China, Laos and Cambodia. Each of these three countries, China in particular, is considered authoritarian (CIA World Fact Book, 2012). This is supportive of the idea that the geographic location of a country can influence its political nature. While Vietnam may not be the best example of this, countries in the Middle East are better proof of how authoritarian rule is able to persist in areas where it is surrounded by other examples of authoritarian states (Bellin, 2004).
Culture and religious influence
Culture often determines the social norms that people accept in a society. If cultural leanings dictate complacency and passivity, then civil unrest or protest is unlikely. By that token, religious teachings have the same effect; Kramer wrote on how Islam, as a religion, was not able to function viably in a democracy (1993). This was because of the conflicting fundamental opinions on how leaders of an Islamic or democratic state are chosen; either through divine anointment (as is practiced in Islam law) or by way of free and fair elections (as is expected in functioning democracies).
81% of the Vietnam population, perhaps because of the state’s Socialist leanings, are not religious according to the most recent census (CIA World Fact Book, 2012). However, similar to China’s Cultural Revolution, the Vietnamese government made an effort to control access to western culture soon after the country gained independence (Duk, 2013). This limited the populations’ knowledge of freedom and, consequently, their drive to seek it.
Conclusion
The endurance of authoritarian regimes is dependent on many factors which include civil society, the economy, poverty levels, geographic location and culture. The economic structure and geographic location are independent of the population, but have an immense effect on the structure of a state’s economy and political system. Most importantly, perhaps, is the role of people in an authoritarian state that determines the endurance of it. The nature of a state’s civil society, and their cultural underpinnings, account for a vital role in shaping the mind-set of the population; they can either cause a drive for freedom and democracy, or a propensity to be complacent. Ultimately, an authoritarian regime can endure for centuries if the population is not willing to contest it.
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Reference List
Bellin, Eva. 2004. The robustness of Authoritarian in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective, Comparative Politics 36 (2), 139-141.
CIA World Fact Book. Vietnam. Available Online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html [viewed: 5th May 2013]
Duk, k. 2013. Fear of Change in Vietnam. Available online: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-060313.html [viewed: 17th April 2013]
Geddes, B. 2005. Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.
Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. 2006. Authoritarian regimes: stability, change, and pathways to democracy, 1972-2003. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
Kramer, M. 1993. Islam vs. Democracy. Commentary, New York, American Jewish Committee, 95, 35-35.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of democracy, 13(2), 51-65.
O'neil, P. H. (2007). Essentials of comparative politics. WW Norton.
Oxhorn, P. 1995. Organizing civil society: The popular sectors and the struggle for democracy in Chile. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Thayer, C. A. 2009. Vietnam and the challenge of political civil society. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 31(1), 1-27.
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